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A GAME-THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF RIDDLES 
LÁSZLÓ TARNAY 
A. József University Szeged 
1. Introductory Remarks: Games and Literature 
There is hardly another field of what is termed literature in 
which the main features of games could be more conspicuous 
than in riddles; most native and foreign observers of the riddles 
of primitive peoples have given accounts of the hour-long 
sessions, when the community splits into two groups, one a 
riddle-poser the other a riddle-solver, and an almost infinite 
sequence of utterance pairs would follow. These empirical 
facts quite naturally convey the idea of there being two 
players to make their moves in a game. What at first sight 
seems problematic is how the possible outcome of such an infi-
nite process can be defined. But concerning the relationship of 
two utterance pairs almost nothing is known - the sequence of 
pairs can at any point be interruptedtor taken up again -, if 
we restrict the use of 'game' to a single pair, the outcome 
of such a game should be clear: the title of winner or loser 
is assigned either to the riddle-poser or to the riddle-solver 
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if the riddle is left unsolved or is correctly answered 
respectively. From this it is already clear that the basic 
problem is whether one and the same type of game is being 
played all through a. given sequence. 
If the identification of the elements of a game with the 
elements of a riddle can be allowed, then some very natural 
theoretical assumptions follow; 
(CI) Riddles are a kind of face-to-face game, in which 
physical contact is required to hold the two players 
together. 
(.02) What counts as a move in such a game is an utterance. 
(C3) The outcome of a game is intentional in that it is 
the intention of the player making the first move 
to determine what can count as a correct move in 
response. 
From CC1) - (C3) it follows that 
(C4) Riddles have the form of a dialogue, 
from (CI) - (C4): 
CC5) The possible roles of Speaker and Hearer are 
assigned to the two players respectively. 
Finally, from (CI) - tC5) we conclude that 
(C6) Riddles are °a special kind of language game. 
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We dub (C2) as the Semantic Condition and (C3) as the Pragmatic 
Condition of Riddles (SCR, PCR), and call (CI) - (C6) the 
Language Game Criteria of Riddles (LGCR). Now, what further 
conclusions result if we consider riddles as a subdomain of 
literature? Accepting Abrahams' conception of folklore genres,* 
three important claims need stating; from (CI) it is clear that 
(C7) Riddles belong to what are called conversational 
genres. 
Sc we dub (CI) as the Conversational Condition of Riddles (CCR). 
Moreover, from (CI) - (C7) we have: 
(C8) Riddles as a genre always contain the Hearer, without 
the possible moves of which they cannot be considered 
as such, neither can they be transmitted or even 
written down by any other means, either. 
This would mean that riddles are a special sub-domain of 
literature in that the Hearer (or the Reader, respectively) is 
not only encoded in them but is an integral part of their 
semantic structure. It adds up to the claim that was first 
stated by Lord and Parry in connection with epic poetry about 
performances happening once for all. This with (C8) amounts to 
saying: 
(C9) Riddles are highly performative in that the Hearer 
and the Addressee coincide in them. 
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This we dub as the Performative Condition of Riddles (PFCR). 
What it says is that "the performance is a moment of creation" 
not only "for the singer" but for the audience, too. But if a 
move in a riddle game is basically characterized by (CCR) and 
(PFCR), there seems to open an abysmal gap between riddles and 
any other literary form; this is because riddles cannot be 
assigned a whole semantical unit unless they are embedded in a 
game, in which the audience will react with a move to each move 
of the Speaker; whereas in case of other genres the Hearer or 
the Addressee is just one of the many pragmatic factors to be 
possibly considered as what can give a communicative aspect to 
either a text or a virtually pre-existing set of formulae. 
s 
Genre is then pragmatic and must be construed while taking 
stock of anything that could be pragmatically relevant in the 
case of a literary utterance. Even if we accept this principle 
as correct, and let alone genre as such, we would like to 
inquire into the justification as to what can be taken stock 
of; whether it is right to consider the role of the Hearer as 
merely pragmatic and to construe the semantic model of the text 
with the assumption of an ideal Reader. We term 'the Pragmatic 
Fallacy' of literature as an affirmative answer to the above 
question. Here, in the forthcoming pages we would like to 
argue thait, given the introduction of game-theoretical elements 
into one of the sub-domains of literature, a tentative theory 
to provide a general explanation of what we call literature will 
bear out the involvement of concrete Hearers in the construction 
of any possible semantic model of a literary text; i.e. the gap 
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between riddles and other sub-domains of literature must needs 
/ 
be bridged. To prove this we aim at finding what can properly 
serve as formulae in case of riddles. Our use of 'formula' does 
not deviate from that of Lord, i.e. from "a regular unit of 
speech" but it deepens it in a very important sense: it shows 
how reference is involved in it and how the mapping of correct 
individuals relies on what the Hearer has chosen as his strategy. 
Before developing our idea about riddles we should make cl'ear 
what justifies the introduction of game-theoretical elements 
into the analysis of a literary genre. We have already mentioned 
some empirical observations that could strongly support such an 
approach. They tell us that orally riddles come into being as a 
result of certain games, i.e. they are played. This means that 
(CI) - (C3) are empirically justified. But there a theoretical 
justification can be found for them, too. The argument, from 
which this justification can be drawn, can be termed as the 
Variability of Surface Forms. To heavily empirically biased 
scientists (VSF) may sound too general. But we think that a 
careful reading of Eigen-Winkler's famous book about games 
played with/in Nature would make such an argument reasonable. 
The introduction of game-theoretical strategies into scientific 
explanations raises two problems; one is whether there should 
be always something substantially manifested in Nature as a 
player at the same time that there is something to correspond 
to each move in the game? The strategies then would go back to 
what are somewhat imperfectly dubbed as 'players'. This 
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imperfection is the uncertainty in determining why a given 
strategy has been chosen. And behind this question lies another 
question regarding the formulation of a possible causal chain: 
whatj makes what2 do whatNow, in game-theory we substitute 
moves into what^ and players into whatWhat-^ is defined as the 
higher or lower degree of the reasonableness of choosing a 
strategy; this amounts to a probability factor. But what can 
justify my saying that moves are determined by the reasonable 
acknowledgement of a probability factor? Only that there is a 
more-or-less reasonable player. But how can this player be 
empirically detected? Only through and by the moves he makes; 
nothing else can I know of him but by what he does. To eliminate 
.what 2 as a player we would have to totally conditionalize it, 
i.e. we would have to know all the conditions that have a role 
in the coming into being of what y then we could reduce "what^ 
makes what2 do what into "what-y makes what , which is 
identical with "what^ causes what3". For instance, in case of 
a Life-and-Death game I could claim to know all the c ^ , • • • , c n 
conditions required for eliminating the probability factor of 
an e^ event that has corresponded to a move in the original 
game, and consider their sum total CKc^c^t • •• a cause 
of e^. Then the idea of player may seem redundant: I could speak 
of some organic process in cells as causing e-̂  instead of 
speaking of Life as choosing a certain strategy. Although there 
are serious troubles about knowing C, i.e. whether C is enough 
to cause e., it will always allow a new question to a rise: 
while it reduces "what^ makes what ̂  do what^" into "what^ 
makes what " it asks for the extension of the latter into 
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"what4 makes what^ do what; e.g. why are some chemical 
substances such that they cause e/l find then there seems to be 
no way out of this infinite regress as the same extension can 
be applied to any what^ element of a causal chain. The only 
reasonable solution appears to be to revert to some game-
-theoretical device considering all newly made extensions as 
infinite conditionalizing and making each chain correspond to ' . " 
an information processing. Our games then will be information-
-dependant; conditionalizing is made with respect to two 
possible moves of the players. The other point, which the 
introduction of game-theory seems to emphasize, is what we called 
(VSF). While the argument of causal chains may at least theore-
tically satisfy us, when applied to (VSF) it appears very 
unpromising; for as long as we deal with events we have to 
decide between two alternatives: it either comes down or not: 
if it does, we may;more-or-less be happy with our definition of 
C and need not bother with a possible negative answer: but 
when we deal with structures we have almost infinite alternatives, 
and what we would like to do is decide why certain alternatives 
are preferred and others neglected. To apply the causal chain 
argument here would be an irremediable failure since it would 
never be able to account for the problem of mutated variants. 
For, to solve it we should also examine all possible variants, 
some of which need not be instantiated, or if so, we should 
not have come across any of them; and there can be no causal 
chain for possible structures which have never been observed 
to hold. The way-out again appears to be game-theoretical: to 
/ 
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decide whether a mutation is preferable is strategy-dependant. 
Preference naturally relied on some pre-conditions C', but no 
possible extension of it can amount to explaning why a certain 
preference relation prevails. The most a heavily empirically' 
biased scientist could say is that they are "out there". 
From the two arguments above it is clear that game-theory blurs 
the distinction between a "de dicto" and a "de re" reading; 
for, appealing to the causal chain argument we arrive at a pro-
cess of infinite conditionalizing of probabilities, and in this 
case a recurrance to strategies covers a lack of "de dicto" 
knowledge; whereas appealing to (VSF) we arrive at a preference 
selection of certain mutations and the probability of their 
survival, which is not information-dependent, and then recurrence 
to strategies would explain away a "de re" selection of forms. 
The ambiguity, or on the contrary, the disambiguation of 
ambiguities, is a characteristic feature of game-theory. From 
both arguments it follows that game-theory is adopted as a 
means to examine relations differently manifested and not con-
crete individuals, although it is always a concrete case that 
the theory can be applied to. And this seems to be the major 
advantage of game-theory; i.e. being thoroughly general it 
gains body from each new collection of data. The supposition 
of there being players making moves does not then require 
any substantial formulation, but it is the price we have to 
pay for the failure of founding all our theoretical knowledge 
on the principle of induction. And we consider it is a very 
\ 
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small price to pay. 
Now, how does this bear on the assumptions we have to make when 
we introduce game-theory into the field of humanities, the 
subject matter of which is basically characterized by the use 
of language? It is an ironical assertion that game-theory has 
been neglected in a field where a metaphysical reading of 
players would be once and for all excluded, while it has been 
being developed over since its first formulation in such fiedls 
as biology, mathemetics and abstract languages where the concept 
of player can never be defined in a philosophically satisfying 
way. The identification of the Speaker and the Hearer with 
the two players, then, is almost trivial. Where the trouble 
seems to lurk is in the value-assignment of possible moves or 
in the testing of the reasonableness of a given strategy. And 
even if we succeeded in this, it would always remain a hopeless 
effort to account for the players as being governed by a 
reasonable choice from their possible moves. What (PCR) tells 
us is just that speaking is intentional in that possible 
outcomes of games always rely on the expectations of the 
players. Although by -stating some such expectations as pre-
-conditions of games wo could achieve a pragmatic disambiguation, 
our semantic model is left inevitably ambiguous. For any method 
to restrict ambiguities would lead either to too narrow models 
(we simply exclude problematic data as irrelevant or erroneous) 
or to the introduction of some philosophically dubious entities 
(like possible, worlds) in an infinite number. So, while we could 
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successfully substitute into the second two elements of a 
"whaty - what2 - whatchain, the interpretation of what^ 
remains inadequate in a sense that no causal relationship should 
be assumed to hold between vwhat^" and "wKat^'i whereas in the 
natural sciences we can have a good probability factor. This 
means that even if any of the players tends to be reasonable 
taking into consideration the probability of a given move, it 
may not guarantee the successfulness of his move for the inten-
tion of his opponent my still aim at something quite different: 
he may put in: ''My move was not what you made it out!"; whereas 
in other games from chese to economics we have in a sense a 
direct understanding of what a previous move can be. But as 
language games are basically governed by something like our 
(PCR) and as we have no means to detect what takes place in the 
human mind, what intention a player has just conceived when 
making his move, although the move of his opponent is going to 
be a reaction to what he deems his intention to be, games 
played with linguistic utterances are two times open to failures 
(i) moves contain not just utterances but the interpretations 
of them, (ii) even an unambiguously counted interpretation 
cannot be put into a causal relationship with a given intention 
of the player. The first problem has arisen from the non-unique 
predictability of a reasonable move, and brings home the idea 
what a semantic game can be about: the uncertainty of a value-
-assignment of a move; while the second problem calls for a 
means of pragmatic disambiguation of the semantic uncertainty. 
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But how can we assign values to moves at all? Even if we might 
not know why or which value-assignment, i.e. interpretation, 
is being intended by a given move, we can try to evaluate it. 
Here we encounter something similar to what we can know about 
a player: only his action; to decide what the value-assignment 
of an utterance can be an action of seeking and finding is 
required with respect to a given individual who is thought to 
belong to one or more predicate-assignment contained by the 
utterance. It is always on the basis of certain predicate-
-assignment that an individual can be found out there in 
reality. But what if this individual is not found or it does 
not exist? Did we make a move by choosing a predicate-assignment 
all the same? Of course we did; we must have done, or else we 
should dispense with the idea of playing. But when can we make 
sure of the non-existence of an individual? Possibly never; 
for, we cannot limit our search to a certain domain unless it 
is an empirical one containing a deictic term as "this world", 
"this house", etc.; or else it being linguistic like "the A. which 
are B", we can get lost again in an infinite procedure of 
finding at least one representative of class B which is also A. 
But we are going to argue that it need not be a counter-argument 
against game-theory as a language game for, as there is no 
causal relationship involved in such a game, we can very easily 
say that in- case of an infinite seeking and finding games get 
blocked and play is interrupted. But if so, we must have some 
means of constructing what a possible course of a game may be 
regardless of whether it can be concluded with a successful 
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search or not. To accomplish this we need (VSF); linguistic 
structures and their mutations in speech, together with the 
wide range of their possible interpretations, closely parallel 
the variability of forms in nature; in both cases we have to 
consider possible variants. We should be able to describe this 
semantic openness and how conflicting or correct selections from 
them are being realized. What we cannot do is predict without 
uncertainty whether a given selection will be realized as far 
as the players are concerned. But we do not see how else we 
could map the infinite variability of forms into concrete 
realisations other than game-theoretically. 
The most extensive treatment of a field basically characterized 
by the use of language along the lines of game-theory has been 
3 
accomplished by J. Hintikka and his followers. So it may seem 
natural that in trying to apply game-theory to such an over-" 
-discussed problem as a literary genre we should go back to 
their major achievements in the field. There must be a very 
natural sense in which the strategies in ordinary communicative 
situations bear on the possible strategies of the riddle-poser 
and the riddle-solver respectively. This would not mean that 
there is nothing else in the latter that cannot be traced in 
the former. But the divergencies that can crop up would belong 
to what we called the pragmatic pre-conditions of games or to 
what can .enter into the definition of a literary genre. But 
there should be a common semantic structure - let us term it 
'Semantic Strategic Possibility' (SSP), which would run on 
parallel lines with our argument of (VSF). We call this 
possibility semantic because it involves reference. It should 
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add to the fact why Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics turns 
on games for quantifiers in a language. The interpretations of 
certain terms are then defined by the application of some of 
the strategies of any of the two players as different substitu-
tions of individuals. The disambiguation of different readings 
can easily be understood as a constraint on individual selection; 
at the-same time one and only one individual is to be chosen, 
for to understand a predicate-assignment both empirically and 
psychologically can only be possible if one single individual 
is being considered at a time. We will not understand "All men 
are clever" or "The murderer must be insane" unless we take 
concrete individuals from the class of men and examine them one 
by one whether he is clever or not, or we take an individual of 
whom it is true that he is the murderer and examine whether he 
is also insane. It is important to emphasize that this is how 
we can understand these sentences, but we need not pursue the 
quest till we can find such an individual. For the quest can 
atany time be interrupted and the play abandoned. Then we are 
left with a sentence in some way connected with the vague idea 
of an individual, of whom we can have no direct perceptual 
knowledge. But we sti°ll have to understand the sentence, and 
our behaviour in understanding it is characterized by (SSP). 
So, we no longer need the distinction between definite and 
indefinite, notional and referential, 'de dicto' and 'de re' 
readings just because they are external to language. Of course, 
we can always add phrases like "Whatever he be", "I do not think 
there exists such a person", etc. but they would not tell us 
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anything about the meaning of the original sentence; they 
rather inform us about the Speaker's attitude or his intention 
in communicating the sentence. (Cf. the Speaker's intention in 
ordinary communication to specify referenti'ally even if he 
has only some means of notional specification vs what we have 
called 'secret' as being a deviation from it, when he intends 
the Hearer not to specify referentially although he (the Hearer) 
has a conflicting intention to do so even if he (the Hearer) has 
only some means of notional specification.) 
From the above passage it results that in some way we cannot 
neglect the problem of reference in cases of what should be 
called literature, although reference in fiction has turned 
out to be an almost insurmountable problem. But what the ar-
gument of (SSP) along (VSF) has taught us lies in that just as 
a mutated variant can never be causally linked to any of the 
players (although it is "out there") no player can be made 
a 
responsible for causally blocking the reference of expressions 
used in fictional discourse. Of course, he may intend to do so, 
or intend this intention to be recognized by his opponent in 
the game, but the posibility of a different move is already 
contained by (SSP). (SSP) is then a basic criterion of literature 
for it embraces (VSF) for the interpretations of utterances, 
without which no game for literature can have a beginning; 
otherwise it turns out to be like ordinary communication, in 
which unambiguous results, the lowest possible degree of 
variability, are expected. 
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To sum up our basic claims we can say the following: if we 
wish to apply game-theory in literature basically characterized 
by the use of some language, and if a game-theoretical model of 
semantics involves different intepretations of sentences, 
literature must be viewed as a possible extansion of divergent 
interpretations. This amounts to stating our (SSP), which, should, 
in a very natural way, explain away every possible mutated variant 
that can crop up in a game. Moreover, if.literature is considered 
from a game-theoretical point of view, then the answer to what 
can count as a formula in a given genre is forthcoming: each 
game can be defined by constructing a matrix or a fragment of a 
matrix which will contain what the players believe, i.e. the 
interpretations that are available for them. Such a matrix is 
a regular unit of speech in that it generates possible variants 
that belong to a given genre. 
2. The Variability of the Surface Forms of Riddles and their 
Possible Logics 
In the works of different ethnologists riddles have turned out 
to be such a complex phenomenon that even the categorizations 
of the variants appear divergent or conflicting; besides the 
term 'riddle', occasionally 'enigma', 'pun', and 'puzzle' are 
equally used to cover a range of utterances in which something 
is to be found out. In some cases 'enigma' is defined so that 
it should comprise data figuring in folk narrative' e.g. 
Flahault4 seems to appeal to this kind of use, but later in 
- 114 -
his paper he uses the French 'devinette' almost interchangeably 
with 'enigme'. We feel that a distinction between riddles and 
enigmas as being narrative in character should be adequately 
grounded. Enigmas would then make up a different genre comprising 
stories that are ciphered in a certain way. But this is not 
all; for.there are some Hungarian legends or folktales, which 
contain special utterances ordering particular actions to be 
carried out, but to do so they first need to be deciphered. We 
may dub them as 'enigmatic orders'. Somewhat similar to them 
are some childish sayings giving the order to draw what one 
can make out of them so that they might be deciphered. What 
all these examples have in common is that one needs to decipher 
them is a certain way to comprehend what they say. Something 
must be found 
out. This naturally relates to the problem of 
codes: we somehow do not seem to understand them at first 
sight. So, there is a unique character underlying each of-these 
utterances, i.e. the way they can be comprehended. If to be 
understood they need to be decphered, the modes of deciphering 
them should reveal the modes of understanding that play an 
important part in their comprehension. And these modes should 
reflect the possible logics that can be applied to them. By 
giving a logical form to riddles, then, we should aim at -
developing a procedure governing our minds in comprehending 
them. And. this procedure should give us the deciphering clues. 
This procedure is what a strategy in a game can prescribe. The 
procedure of finding a solution is a particular content of an 
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algorithm by which it can be. computed. When we choose such an 
algorithm to cipher a.given utterance,. we make a move in a 
language game. This language game differs.in a very important 
sense from games for quantifiers: we do not select an individual 
at once and go over to see whether he instantiates a certain 
property, but we select a clue called algorithm, and as it is 
a language game, this clue has to be identified linguistically, 
i.e. it has to be an expression, be it a predicate or a term, v. 
for we have to be able»to communicate it or make it manifest 
as a move, and what else can be communicated other than what 
can be part of an utterance? Seen from this point every 
utterance that would require the use of an algorithm will belong 
to a field characterized by the question of something to be 
found out. But the 'thing' itself should not enter into the 
definition of the algorithm; i.e. we have now a logical procedure 
in which all the former analyses of riddles can be reintegrated. 
These analyses are determined by the underlying question: What 
is there to be deciphered in a given utterance? Then a question 
for the clue is a question for the type of data it can be 
applied to. From this it follows that there should be as many 
logical forms of riddles as there are ways for the above 
question to be answered. According to Barabanova^ there are not 
more than forty. From an entirely different point of view, 
Faik-Nzuji6 enlists three different structures of riddles while 
specifying some sub-classes for each. E. KttngSs-Maranda7, on 
the other hand, deals with one single structural type which is 
included in Barabanova's list. We give some of the criteria they 
can have used in setting up their categories in order to show 
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how our game-theoretical approach can reintegrate them. 
(i) . Now many objects are described? 
(ii) What kind of a relationship is there between the 
predicates and the object introduced first? 
(iii) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cates and the object introduced second? 
(iv) What kind of a relationship is there between the two 
objects? 
(v) How much of this relationship is taken up by the predi-
cates? 
(vi) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cate themselves? 
(vii) What kind of a relationship is there between the predi-
cates given for the object introduced first and the 
predicates - that may not have been communicated - of 
the objects introduced second? 
(viii) How does the relationship mentioned in (vi) relate to 
the object and/or its predicates introduced second? 
(ix) Do meta-linguistic considerations play any part in the 
riddle? 
(x) Does the riddle hint.at a mathematical computation? 
(xi) Does the riddle contain a question-word? 
It is clear that any sort of combinations of these criteria 
would lead to different types of logical form. Naturally, the 
greatest problem is that other similar.criteria can be added 
to the above (i) - (xi)j e.g. we can define 
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(xii) Is an action other than speaking part and parcel of 
what a riddle says? 
(xiii) Should an action other than speaking precede linguis-
tic comprehension? 
(xiv) Is there a narrative involved in what should be 
deciphered? 
It is not that we do not admit any grounds for these criteria; 
they very well reflect some of the basic linguistic and extra-
-linguistic structures riddles can have, but it would be a 
mistake to identify a linguistic structure with logical form as . 
such. If the underlying character of riddles proves to be 
algorithmic, then what we have to do is show in some straight-
forward sense how an algorithm is used in computing a solution 
to a riddle. Our approach then will be a further contribution to 
what Hintikka called the need for a fresh symbolism. He hinted 
at the possibility of this but never developed it. To achieve 
this aim we think it promising to resort to mathematical game-
theory. Of course, we have no room here to work out everything 
in detail, so instead we rather present the mainlines of a 
transcriptional procedure in connection with a sub-domain of 
literature with the assumption that it can easily be generalized. 
This relates to the place of reference in literature or in 
fiction. Reference in case of riddles has always been an 
underlying problem; considering some of the criteria we have 
defined we note that objects enter into the picture that 
riddles describe. This would call for them to have a naming cha-
racter, as to what can be named a straightforward answer is a 
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class. This idea gathers force when a second term is introduced 
to name another class and the riddles are taken to be answered 
if an utterance of this term follows. This is the way in which 
E. Kongas-Maranda's analysis is developed; it puts forward the 
view that riddles unfold the possible connections of the two 
classes named respectively in the two parts of their utterance. 
Formulated in this way however it would lead to a meta-linguis-
tically-biased theory of riddles asserting similarities and 
identities of classes. We have already given a critical account 
of' such an approach and have pointed out the absurdities that g 
might follow. We do not want to reproduce our argument here; 
suffice to say that riddles can neither be wholly extensional 
nor express intensional or meta-linguistic identity; Riddles do 
not assert an identity between mere extensions of classes for it 
cannot be permitted that one and the same object is referred 
to by any of its terms, i.e. the two general terms introduced 
in the first and in the second part respectively are just 
intensional variants of one and the same referent; and riddles 
cannot be mere analytical truths, i.e. intensionally identical 
terms used for extensionally different classes, something that 
happens when a child is learning a language, for it is unaccept-
able that, given a riddle about e.g. trees and men, which, say, 
defines a man as a kind of evergreen, anyone from among the 
community.where such a riddle appears, should perceptually 
take a tree for a man. This will be further emphasized when we 
speak about the didactic role of riddles among the primitive. 
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It does not mean however that the role of naming does not have 
any part in riddle sessions. 
Objects do figure in riddle sessions in a sense, i.e. as proto-
types of classes. But they are recalled by means of explicating 
some of their properties. Naturally these properties do not 
remain the same; others can serve to convey reference to either 
the same or to a different class. These properties are used on-
ly to fix reference to one or another reference class. They do 
not have the role of proper names, nor that of general terms, 
for -they cover a wide range of possible usés. This is exactly 
how stereotypes are Used. To choose the right use of a stereo-
type in a given context would, amount to computing the right 
algorithm of a possible strategical move in the correlated lan-
guage-game of the utterance the stereotype occurs in. What we 
can say already at this point of the analysis is that riddles 
are somehow the prototypes of such computational processes. But 
it cannot be wholly segregated to a field of some literary genre, 
for it can become indispensable at any point of an ordinary 
communication, if the Hearer wants to have a thorough under-
standing of what has been said by the Speaker. For instance, 
9 
saying that 'The Daily News did not come to the press conference" 
the Speaker intends the Hearer to recur to some algorithm about 
publication of newspapers in order to select the correct use of 
"Daily News" as a stereotype. But what would this mean? Do we 
refer all the time to such an algorithmic function when uttering 
a sentence? Are there hidden riddles in everyday speach? We 
could save something from the original idea on the difference 
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between ordinary and literary communication by saying that 
riddles should contain composite functions; but a quick survey 
of data soon refutes such a claim. The only thing we can do is 
give some criteria of linguistic identification of riddles as 
stereotypes necessitating certain computational procedures to 
get the correct referent. It would first of all call for some 
syntactical rules to be correlated with our forthcoming game-
-theoretical model. But what syntax can be defined along the 
lines of strategical matrixes? This syntactical problem has 
been already dealt with by Hintikka; he affirmed that in laying 
down the syntactical rules for a game-theoretical semantic 
model one will always include some, elements which are in 
reality the formulations of some semantic conditions. 
Moreover, syntactical transformation will be never meaning-
-preserving. Bearing this in mind we would like to extend 
Hintikka's insight over one important field: stereotypal 
reference. We would like to argue that this is the only type 
of reference that can be relied on in speaking, although there 
are different modes of carrying it out; refering to what 
Wittgeinstein called the entanglement of language with action 
we should emphasize that game-theoretical semantics has been 
conceived just in order to reveal this fact, namely that the 
mode of realizing a strategical move can be either an utterance 
or an act; reference, then, should be viewed as the possibility 
of correlating such an act with a linguistic mode of carrying 
out a move, i.e. an utterance. And it should be added again 
that there is no causal relationship between the two different 
modes of manifesting a strategical move: it is just the possi-
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bility of correlation that is required for the Hearer to 
understand the Speaker's utterance; namely, the Hearer should 
at any time be ready to look for such a correlation. The act 
of refering need not then be deictic, but rather any act 
whatsoever which carries out a certain order conveyed by the 
utterance. However, reference itself is not needed for the 
construction of the possible strategies as a matrix. It is just 
the special content of what we called (PCR), i.e. its possi-
bility is incumbent on what the Speaker intends in a particular 
game. And this is what substitutes preference in language games. 
This is natural, for preference in case of human beings as 
players can be nothing else but intentional. An intention, 
which corresponds to preference relations between surface forms, 
and which is defined by (PCR), is an intention to correlate two 
model of carrying out a move in a game. From this argument 
results the possibility we have already hinted at that the two 
modes of carrying out a move in a game are, in reality, parts 
of two entirely different games. We will develop this idea 
further on when we have accomplished the construction of our 
game-theoretical model. 
To sum up: stereotypal reference is intentional in that it is 
involved in computing a certain algorithm for a correct move 
in a game; it is linguistic in that it is carried out by 
uttering a stereotype with the possibility of correlating an • 
act with it. The semantics of an utterance containing several 
similar stereotypes can be given with a matrix of a language 
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similar stereotypes can be given with a matrix of a language 
game. So far as the linguistic formulation of such an utterance 
is concerned, it depends on the identification of a stereotype 
by a move. This is done by applying an algorithm to it. But a 
stereotype need not be uttered in order to necessitate the use 
of an algorithm. For instance, if I go to see the pictures in 
an art exhibition with a friend of mine, and looking at one of 
them I exclaim: "I like him", my utterance will carry different 
meanings according to how the stereotype "picture" is intended 
to be used without being uttered: whether (i) I mean to refer 
to the painter, or (ii) to the possessor; in the first case I 
should make use of a- function like "x painted y" , whereas in 
the second something like "x is possessed by y". But at the same 
time I can use the stereotype "picture" in a sentence with the 
intention of necessitating a function for understanding it 
correctly; e.g. saying "The picture you liked best won the two-
-thousand dollar prize in the end" I may convey reference not 
to the picture itself but rather to its painter in the sense 
that it must have been him - and not the picture - who got the 
prize. What makes this sentence more interesting is that to 
understand it one has not only to compute a function for the 
painter but to consider the very same stereotype once again as 
calling for a normal interpretation with respect to the clause 
"you liked"; in this latter case we simply use the identity 
function. What we have to underline is that not only the func-
tions, which are used as algorithms to compute the correct 
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referents, may not be uttered, but even the stereotypes them-
selves may not enter into the sentences to be uttered. This 
again raises the problem of identifying a stereotype. Although 
it may prove to be an insurmountable problem, we will never be 
able to make do with stereotypes and the functions they neces-
sitate, for otherwise we cannot single out the correct referent 
in some ordinary examples like the one above; for, consider the 
same sentence "I like him" and suppose there are other visitors 
in the gallery, and one of them, a man, is even standing near 
the picture I happen to be looking at when uttering the 
sentence. How then could the correct reférent be singled out 
as the painter of the picture against the spatio-temporally 
given without recurring to the stereotype "picture"? In the 
next part we investigate the problem of identifying riddles as 
stereotypes, how they can be singled out by some syntactic 
rules, and how these syntactic rules can correspond to the 
semantic moves of the players. 
3. Some Games for Riddles 
In the foregoing passage we tried to argue that riddles contain 
some means of conveying references the modes of whicli can be 
either linguistic or not. As to what these means can be, we 
have said that they are certain computational algorithms selected 
by the use of different stereotypes. The idea of riddles as a 
means of reference may seem at first sight a bit outlandish; 
however many scholars observing the role played by riddles in 
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primitive society do state something similar when they take 
the criterion (i) about how many objects can figure in a given 
riddle seriously. How should we'understand 'objects' in (i) if 
not as something being referred to? How can we compare different 
objects without referring to them? We have seen that it is no 
way-out to say that riddles are about classes. On the other hand 
it seems natural that riddles are not references in the same 
way as for instance a proper name is in ordinary communication. 
This might result in a futile effort to prove in a straight-
forward sense of the word that riddles "refer" in some detectable 
way; we have seen that reference is not causally linked to 
speaking, which means that we cannot use any kind of proof 
procedure in going from an utterance to the objects referred to 
by it. But we can have empirical evidence for the role reference 
of riddles; we expect to find thus in the didactic role they 
play in the life of the members taking part in the sessions. 
Among many observers it is Permyakov"'"^ who discusses at some 
length the didactic' role of riddles. In general it can be re-
-assumed in that they serve as means of storing up and trans-
mitting the knowledge of the aged toward the new generation. 
Riddles had to convey adequately-founded information to provide 
some practical clues to nature for the young. Sessions were not 
simply for the ¿sake of fun but served a very practical aim: they 
were a kind of school for the illiterate. Although this fact is 
not thought to be crucial by Permyakov as far as logical form 
is concerned, we believe that it has to be formulated as an 
important pre-condition of riddles; we may say something like 
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(PCI) The riddle-poser's intention must not aim at something 
far-fetched or even abnormal in the given folklore but 
at something available to the riddle-solver. 
From (PCI) it follows that 
(PC2) The riddle-poser must not aim at winning the game in 
the sense that the correct solution be never found. 
Of course, what counts as 'far-fetched', 'abnormal* or 
'available' in a given folklore is to be properly defined. Though 
(PCI) and (PC2) belong to thé field of pragmatics, they heavily 
bear on how a winning strategy can be given as they govern the 
Speaker's intention, which according to (PCR) basically 
characterizes what can count as correct in a game. Considering 
the_ following examples we will see that as far as variants 
taken from the folklore are concerned the more possible ways 
there are to compute a solution the more indispensable the role 
of (PCI)- and (PC2) gets. This means that the Didactic Argument 
focusses on the restriction of (SSP) and on reducing the possi-
bilities of winning for the riddle-poser while it ensures a 
victory for the riddle solver. This would amount to saying that 
riddle games are unjust forward the riddle-poser. But they have 
to be if they are to guarantee that all profitable information 
should pass over-to.the young. The Didactic Argument then is 
evidence for the historical relationship between everyday life 
and a present literary genre. When we pass from literary 
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utterances closely connected with practical life to more 
sophisticated forms of the same genre, what needs modifying 
is the definition of what counts as a winning strategy in the 
game. The first type of riddles that we are going to examine 
blocks totally the winning possibilities of the riddle-poser. 
They belong to what scholars have described as meta-linguistic 
12 riddles. Consider the.following examples: 
(1) Woman has got one, (2) In ball there is, 
Rock has got two, In earth there is not, 
Worm has got one. In baby there are two, 
- While leech none. Letter 'O' In children there is none. 
The logics of these and similar riddles is obvious: one has just 
to count the letters according to the list of numbers presented 
in the first part of the riddle to find the solution. Indeed, 
after the second word in (1) one is ready with the answer as in 
'rock' there cannot be any other letter twice, which is also 
found in 'woman', than '0'. Redundancy although should not be 
a common feature, for in (2) it is only after the third word 
that we can count for sure the correct answer, and it is only 
a change in the order of the words that is required to, exclude 
redundancy at all. The logics of this kind of riddles is then a 
procedure of a virtually infinite well-ordering in which to 
each of the words an integral is assigned; so, we have an 
infinite set of well-ordered pairs, the first element of which 
is a lexical item, while the second an integral. If we would 
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like to generalize this procedure to any possible ordering of 
words and numbers so that each ordering would map words into 
those integrals which indicate how many times each word contains 
an arbitral letter, we can draw the following matrix; let each 
horizontal line correspond to a series of numbers consisting of 
as many places as the number of the letters in a given alphabet; 
let each number in the series correspond to the times a certain 
letter is contained in the word written at the beginning of the 
line. As the number of the words that can be formed with the 
letters of a given alphabet is infinitely countable, the vertical 
lines will have infinitely many elements. Below we try to 
represent a small fragment of what such a matrix can be; 
FIGURE I 
A B C' D E 
W1 a . . г b . 3 °k dl m n 
»2 a . 3 bk 
d m n o 
W3 ak h a m d n 0 . p 
W n a n b o a V 
d <7 V s 
In FIGURE I each word is coded uniquely according to how many 
times it contains a given letter of the alphabet provided that 
there is no letter which is contained more than nine times in 
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any of the words. This seems however, a very reasonable restric-
tion. Each horizontal line runs through the whole alphabet, and 
the index of each letter in each line indicates how many times 
the given letter is contained in the word written at the 
beginning of the corresponding horizontal line. If we now 
correlate with each such line a possible strategy of the riddle-
-poser (call him Player I) and with each vertical line a 
strategy of the riddle-solver (call him> Player II), then it 
will result that the utterance of a W. is a move made by the . i 
riddle-poser (and the utterances of different W..W......W are 
a joint move of his respectively), whereas the utterance of any 
of the letters of the alphabet is a move made by the riddle-
-solver. Then the matrix of (i) appears as the following: 
FIGURE II 
A C E H K L M N Q R W 
Woman 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Rook 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 o 
Worm 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Leech 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
By a closer scrutiny it becomes clear that each letter i in 
each line can be assigned a probability value with respect to 
a w. and depending on how many letters W. consists of'and on how v t 
many times each letter is contained in it. We can easily formulate 
this condition: 
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(3) P = — , 11 = k = = i v ' k (ak+$l+...\r)~(&l+ym+..,+ir) ak a 
where any 1 5 u > 9 corresponds to how many times a given letter 
is contained in W., which consists of s = {ak+8l+...+ir} different i 
letters, where k, I, m,...r one by one stands for a number 
indicating how many times each letter is contained in W^, while 
the Greek signs one by one stand for a number indicating how 
many letters are contained in 1/. on a par. Usually P, does not 2- K 
amount to 1, which means that if the riddle-poser wants the 
solver to be capable of computing a-solution for sure, he has 
to play with a joint strategy with respect to the sum total t 
of each Pj, for each strategical word. Naturally, if P^ = 1, then 
i . 
no possible inclusion of n+£ strategies into his original one 
would increase the probability of a possible correct answer; 
otherwise riddles become redundant. The riddle-poser's intention 
- if we accept (PCI) and (PC2) - is to maximalize P^, so he 
chooses ^.[^.j...,^ accordingly. Whereas the riddle-solver's 
task is to find an algorithm to W . . . , W , which could = ^ j n 
select a vertical line as his correct strategy such that 5) be 
as near as possible to 1. In other cases there will be more 
than one vertical line for him to choose as a possible strategy. 
To compute £ amounts to a selection of those letters in each 
. W. for which each P, has been counted; then a new computation 
of probability is required with respect to them. It is clear 
that the new probability, i.e. the sum total £ of all independent 
probabilities of the words uttered by Player I as his joint 
strategies will equal 1 only if there is one single letter for 
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which each P^ has been counted. Formulating it we have 
i 
(3) £ = P7 +P, +. . ,+P, = -k . k . k m t- J n 
where P indicates an independent probability and m stands for 
the number of the letters which satisfy the above criterion. A 
final mention must be made concerning words which contain none 
of the letters satisfying that criterion. We write then a zero-
-sign in the place of the corresponding letter in the matrix. 
These words can for all purposes be neglected when one draws 
up an algorithm, for they add no new information to the 
previous words of the joint move, which contain such a letter. 
The riddle game described above has clearly brought home what 
we first stated about algorithms; they are applied to compute 
what strategy a player has to choose if he wants to maximalize 
his probability of finding a correct answer. So an algorithm 
does not coincide with a strategy; for, to define what should 
properly count as a strategy we ought to fill an infinite 
vertical line; the algorithm only selects some value-assignments 
of such a strategy. This game is naturally information-dependent: 
to count the probability value of a given series of words and to 
select an algorithm therewith, requires a knowledge of what 
moves the first player has made when uttering the words in 
question; the winning strategy of Player IX can be defined as 
the correct computation of an algorithm, i.e. the selection of 
that strategy from among the vertical lines expressing a given 
letter of the alphabet which uniquely contains the value as-
signments indicated by the move of Player I (in case of- (1) this 
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is (1,2,1,0) which is the code of the letter '0'); what we 
have is that each riddle contains only one such strategy, 
which means that the solution to it can be counted for sure; 
but theoretically it need not be the case, i.e. the game need 
not be unjust for Player I; so the winning strategy of Player I 
should be one that does not allow a unique computation of an 
algorithm for any of the letters of the alphabet for Player II.' 
But it is easily seen that even in this case Player II might 
turn to the correct computation, and if so, he might turn a 
winning strategy of Player I into a losing one for him. This 
means that the concept of winning strategy can only be defined 
for Player II along the lines of ordinary game-theory: to select 
a strategy that secures winning; while Player I can only make 
ambiguous the selection of such a strategy, in which no strategy 
of Player II can be considered winning unless by (PCR) Player I 
is ready to decide which should be taken to be correct. If we 
turn to other games for riddles we note that it is this latter 
feature which has to be undelined: the importance of (PCR) 
increases as there is no easy way of computing the correct 
algorithm. It is obvious for we no longer have exact value as-
signment but reference to objects; in (1) and (2) we did not 
have to consider reference unless we wanted to take numbers or. 
letters as something being referred to. But most of the riddles 
one encounters deal with objects and their properties. We have 
argued that reference has to enter into the way we understand 
sentences; but how can it be conveyed? This question has been 
so variously answered in the literature that it may seem 
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tiresome even to list them: from causal chain theory to that 
of disguised descriptions, from notional to referential speci-
fication, from individual concepts to world-lines, from commonly 
believed bundles of descriptions to kinds of individuals. What 
our analysis is meant to illuminate is that the two aspects 
couched in the definitions are two sides of the same coin: the 
act of referring is then analogous to an act of ordering and 
re-ordering procedure accomplished by means of language, i.e. 
it is a linguistic function by which a re-ordering of objects 
can be achieved. We have seen that this function need not be 
uttered but is presupposed by the intention of the Speaker. 
Mutual recognition of it then runs on a Gricean line; but to 
construe such a function the moves of both players are needed. 
This is why we have to define whole matrixes to get the right 
re-ordering of objects, or at least that which the Speaker 
intends to be correct. These functions enter into the algorithms 
with which the correct reference is being computed. This brings 
home the fact that reference is accomplished by using a 
stereotype necessitating a given function. This is one side of 
the coin; the other is the possibility of correlating an act 
with each possible strategy; we can even say - further extending 
the idea of winning strategy - that a strategy is winning if 
such a correlation is actually carried out. A winning strategy 
then splits into two parts: first it selects the right func-
tions to the stereotype uttered and establishes what the correct 
use of it can be, and second, it expresses an extra-linguistic 
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act to find out the referents in reality. To explain away this 
two-faced character and their non-causal relationship, we have 
introduced the idea of two different games played independently. 
From now on this idea should be kept in mind. Consider then the 
following example: 
(4) Red mastiff in red courtyard - Tongue. 
Let us give a matrix to (4) first. Modify our original in 
FIGURE I in the following respects; still define the horizontal 
lines as the possible strategies of Player J, and suppose that 
the first part of a riddle like (4) contains a . selection from 
among these strategies, i.e. it expresses a joint move of his; 
the number of these lines then still remains to be infinite; 
correlate now with each vertical line a function (or a composite) 
that is needed for the correct re-ordering of objects (4) 
prescribes for the riddle-solver in order to give the correct 
solution. Allow that in some cases these functions are the 
identity itself, and indicate it by choosing a vertical line 
whose head-word corresponds exactly to that of a given horizontal 
line which is thought to require the application of the identity 
function. Now, we should naturally modify the value-assignments 
of possible moves (the cross-points of each horizontal and 
vertical line); as letters of the alphabet have given place here 
to what.we can call reference to objects, the values should 
reflect somehow the possible referents of a given stereotype. 
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We aré here in favour of a so-called Fregein alternative to 
accept objects as values of functions; we could assign a value 
according to whether a given move has achieved a successful 
re-ordering, i.e. it aims at existing objects. Then we can 
either define this value so that it corresponds to the number 
of these existing individuals, or consider only two cases: 
whether there is at least one such existing individual or there 
is none, and define the first case as a positive value 1, whereas 
the second as a zero value o. We prefer the latter choice just 
to escape futile complications; but it is important to note 
that a value 1 for a move does not decide between an existential 
or a universal quantification, but rather indicates existing 
individuals there. Absurd properties can easily be evaluated in 
this way; a stereotype like 'angel' or 'unicorn' indicates a 
zero-value if any player happens to choose it for a move; they 
necessitate an identity function which results in a zero-value. 
While an expression like 'winged horse' necessitates a function 
other than the identity but results in a zero-value as well. Of 
course, there will be possible moves to which no value can be 
assigned at a certain stage of the play; but this is no 
surprise if we think of language as means of expressing, 
transmitting and preserving knowledge about objects: for it is 
shown by our construction of a matrix that the divulgation of 
a move is only possible with the help of one or the other 
head-expression, i.e. it can be a move made either by the 
Speaker or by the Hearer, or both. If it is the first case, the 
stereotype has been communicated, if it is the second, it has 
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been left to be a presupposition of what was uttered, and if 
it is the third, no re-ordering is required by the Speaker for 
it necessitates the use of the identity function while in the 
first case it is some other function that he gives which is. 
intended. From this it is clear that one and the same property 
can convey reference to distinct classes of objects depending 
on what strategy Player II selects. A sequence of riddle games 
or of any other form of communication can be viewed as a 
gradual filling up of a potentially infinite matrix, i.e. newer 
and newer combinations of properties are achieved through the 
help of different functions other than the identity; every new 
correct move indicates an extension of the set of objects 
players have already encountered during the play. A play is 
then a potentially infinite series of games that aims at 
transmitting as much information about the world as possible. 
The domain of all existing individuals will not be defined in 
advance just because it is a domain that can only be described 
• by the actual stage of the play, i.e. how many games have been 
already played off. The realm of known objects is always 
extending, its boundaries always questioned with a new 
assignment. We think it is a very reasonable account of what 
an epistemological process can be. Of course, the process can 
have started at a certain time, but why should we have noted it; 
we can start playing again, and need or need not take into 
consideration what the previous games resulted in. It may very 
easily happen that a game played long ago is restarted again for 
- 136 -
the players simply do not remember what the original moves 
were. This equally bears out the fact that the actual seeking 
and finding of the individuals referred to with the selection 
of functions are inevitably removed from the moves made in the 
course of an algorithmic game; so much so that it must count 
as a new game. The relationship of the two types of games is 
postponed to a later stage of our analysis. 
We can now represent the matrix according to which players play 









in the mouth in a closed space Red 
In FIGURE III we proceeded as it was prescribed; the strategies 
of Player I are indicated horizontally and those of Player II 
vertically; we designated the words appearing in the first part 
of the riddle of (4) as moves of Player I and selected some 
functions as moves of Player II and indicated them by their 
natural ranges: so, 'in the mouth1 stands for "x is in the 
mouth of ytt or equally for "y has in his mouth x", and 'in a 
closed space' stands for is in the closed space of y", while 
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'Red' indicates an identity function. Finally we filled ,.in a 
possible solution (indeed the solution (4) presents) and 
defined it as what has a positive value for each assignment 
with respect to the functions indicated vertically. We indicated 
it in as a possible strategy of Player I just to show that it 
is his intention that decides whether a solution can be correct 
and that uttering a corresponding term like this he may have 
necessitated only the identity. All possible solutions should 
satisfy this criterion, but it is not necessary that there 
should be only one such term. For the ominious point in computing 
an algorithm for (4) with the matrix of FIGURE III is how we 
name our move as Player II. This we have to do because the 
selection of an algorithm is heavily influenced by what we deem 
to be the intention of Player I. In FIGURE II each different 
veritically running algorithm gives us the very same result, 
i.e. the same letter can be coded in different games but 
requires the same algorithm; this goes for our vertical head-
-expressions here as well; but the algorithms which these 
expressions determine are no longer the same just because the 
value-assignments they run through indicate different configura-
tions of objects, which may even overlap, and not simple inte-
grals. With other words we can say that their intégrais stand 
in a sense for 'themselves' or are unanimous, while here 
integrals or the zéro-sign stand for objects. But as we have 
said we cannot extend our knowledge of these individuals without 
recurring to a commonly accepted term. We can wholly formulate 
how to count value-assignments by using algorithms: we consider 
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one or many assignments already counted in a vertical line 
and try to find or select an algorithm with the properties 
belonging to those assignments and/or to another property with 
still a zero-assignment by using a function defined by a veri-
tical property. A joint move by Player I may necessitate a joint 
move by Player II, i.e. a selection of a composite function or 
diverse independent functions; and the more strategies a joint 
move of Player I goes back to, the easiest it is for Player II 
to compute a correct algorithm. We then formulate a route to 
fill in a matrix for (4) in the following manner: 
(a) Define class A as the class of mastiffs and as an already 
computed move from a previous stage of the play, and enter 
it as a strategy of Player I (naturally A would contain 
all possible value-assi 
gnments along its horizontal line); 
call A as the Designatum Class; 
(b) Define class B as the range of reference so that it contain 
red things, and enter it both as a strategy of Player I 
and Player II (note: it necessitates the identity function) 
(c) Select a function /' from a set of reference functions RF 
such that "x has in his mouth y"; 
(d) Define V as the natural range of f, i.e. things in one's 
mouth, and enter it as a strategy of Player II; 
(e) Allowing that no A is B 
(f) Select a class B' such that it be the intersection of B 
and )'; 
(g) Define fl' as a possible move of Player II, and term it 
(if it has not been termed yet) like 'tongue'. 
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The same computation can be given for each expression of (4) .. 
We indicated it on our matrix. If we computed a function for 
each expression (note: identity functions have to be computed 
first) we may be able to formulate them in a composite like 
"x has in his mouth j in a closed space of 2". This is then 
the correct algorithm for (4). It is a composite function 
extending from a Designation Class A to a reference class 1 
which are W. Naturally, computing•such an algorithm depends on 
the selection of the range of reference to which an identity 
function is available; here it amounted to the choice of red 
things as such; this may seem arbitrary, but it is many times 
indicated by the fact that a riddle contains incompatible 
properties; namely that mastiffs and courtyards cannot be red. 
This is in accord with saying that a game at a certain stage 
of play presupposes some already counted assignments from 
previous stages. Mention must.be made.about the kind of func-
tions that can enter into an algorithm; there are two possibi-
lities: it either extends from a zero-assignment to any other 
one, or considers an already counted positive value and looks 
for any other such that it be equally true of the corresponding 
individuals. The first we call a normal reference function, 
while the second can be called an Equal Distribution Function 
as it maps the sub-classes of a class into sub-classes of 
another. Selecting a correct algorithm then depends on uttering 
more and more properties to which an identity function can be 
applied and/or M-intending functions which can make up an 
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algorithm as a whole. All this seems right except for one 
point: nothing can guarantee that an identity function has 
to be computed in each case where it is possible. There are 
riddles which are based on exactly this feature, i.e. they 
necessitate a new function to be applied although they can 
necessitate an identity. But consider a more difficult example, 
namely 
(5) Blind cock jumping crows - Axe. 
In constructing a matrix for (5) no function / seems to be 
available for the term 'hen'. We may choose something like "x 
is cut down by w" but it would not press our computation 
further, for a range of reference defined as things that 
jump will not select out a significant sub-class of the natural 
range i of f like things used for cutting, while the fact 
whether it can be true of the class of cooks adds nothing 
to our computational algorithm. Then we can proceed as follows: 
start with a range of reference for example jumping things; 
(a) Define a function "x is cut down by u" such that W be a 
class of men; 
(b) Define a function "w uses in cutting y" such that Y 
intersects with B,; 
(c) Define an Equal Distribution Function g such that it 
equally maps X into Z or into A^ where g is "¡/ makes 
a sound of z", A^ is the class of hens and A2 a class of 
things that crow; 
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(d) Define the new composite function as "w uses in cutting 
y making a sound of 2"; 
(e) Define a function h as "i directs v." such that it 
intersects with a range of reference B^ like the things 
that are blind; 
(f) Allowing that W and T, V, and X have common sub-classes 
(g) We arrive at a final composite like "w directs in cutting 
y making a sound of s" that should have overlapping sub-
-classes with both ranges of reference B^ and B2-
The single moves through which the above algorithm runs along 
may or may not be given a name in the course of the game; cf. 
the definition of tongue in FIGURE III. If we do not name each ' 
range our functions map out we can have in the end something 
like "a means used for cutting that is jumping while being 
directed by somebody". This has to serve for as adequate 
information to provide the term 'axe'. Representing (5) in a 
matrix we can have the following figure; this time we indicate 
only those assignments that are required during the computation 
of the algorithm; 
In FIGURE IV we wrote with capital letters the moves of 
Player II when he rearranged the matrix by corresponding a 
natural range of a function with a new range of reference. 
Our new game then again turns out to be information-dependent, 
for it is based on the selection of a correct range of reference. 
This modifies a bit what we have said about a possible winning 
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FIGURE IV 
jumping cut dcwn used for cutting making a sound directed blind 
Cock 1 0 0 1 0 
Jumping 1 1 




1 1 1 0 






1 1 1 1 0 
strategy of Player I; to minimalize the possibility of Player II 
winning he should select his joint move either so that it 
contains very few - probably no - moves that express a zero-
assignment, or so that it contains almost only - probably all -
moves that express zero-assignments. From FIGURE IV it is clear 
that (5) belongs rather to the first than to the second case. 
If it did not contain the expression 'blind', (5) would very 
much resemble normal communication in that an identity function 
could be used for each element it contains. Whereas in the 
other case riddles would be similar to metaphores used in more 
sophisticated litarary forms. Another important thing that 
FIGURE IV illuminates is that although value-assignments 
depend on. what common knowledge about previous stages of the 
play is presupposed and there can" be no restriction to what 
function Player I intends Player II to select - be it the 
identity or not, the most what we can say about ̂ the winning 
strategy of Player I is that his only choice is to minimalize 
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his opponent's possibility of winning by carefully selecting 
his joint move from among his possible strategies expressed 
by the expressions that can be formulated within a given 
language. From this it follows that what the pre-conditions 
of a game do is that they clearly prescribe in what sense 
Player I can minimalize the possibility of Player II winning. 
In other words they tell us what his possible intentions could 
be during a series of games; and moreover, by defining such 
notions as 'available', 'absurd' etc. we can significantly 
restrict the chances of Player I cheating: what may be resonably 
expected in a game must be intended by Player I. Of course 
this cannot go as far as a "reductio ad absurdum", for then 
playing will have no sense and the game will be wholly unjust 
for Player I and very partial to Player II. And this is the 
point where normal communication may start; although even in 
the latter there remains a slight impartial feature from which 
new games might have a start. And this possibility of new games, 
we urge, is an inherent character of language; it can be 
suppressed or it can be set free but it can never be totally 
eliminated. 
4. Some Syntactic Considerations: A Semantic Dependence 
In drawing some»conclusions about our matrixes from their 
syntactic, characteristics we should instead turn to the results 
of game-theoretical semantics. However there are two important 
points in which our games differ from those described by Hintikka 
and his followers; namely that (i) the roles of the two players 
are assigned to the Speaker and the Hearer respectively, and 
(ii) they often introduce individuals, the seeking and finding 
process of which has been interrupted or deadlocked or simply 
13 
has not already been accomplished. What our matrixes have 
taught us is that we can very easily use a zero—assignment in 
computing a correct move, i.e. a move which expresses a positive 
value; nothing impedes me saying: "Going to sweep the house?" 
- "There are some very nice witches in the bathroom." - giving 
that there is a function "a: is used to fly with by y" intended 
with which a correct computation of the stereotype 'brooms.' can 
be carried out. From this it results that a verification process 
relies.heavily on what we called the computation of an algorithm. 
This dependence we believe is already in Hintikka's works when 
he speaks about partial functions as being substituted into 
propositions. Such a function is a further specification of 
some individual (s), and a forthcoming seeking process should 14 
be pursued on the basis of such a specification. G. Nunberg 
procided some very explicit cases when a seeking process 
cannot even have a beginning unless such specifications are 
computed. Sentences like "The soprano played wrong" "I like 
chicken", "I have not read Dickens", etc. can only be understood 
if we are aware of such functions as "x play y", "x is the meat 
of y", "x-wrote y", etc. In riddles we do nothing but ask for 
such functions, or rather for those further specifications that 
such functions can map. In riddles however we are not for 
concrete referents as in ordinary communication when we consider 
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to the use of such a function; we rather map out whole classes, 
which we may or may not redub when making a move. This very 
naturally parallels what Hintikka called the naming of an 
individual to be substituted into a given variable. What needs 
further emphasizing is that it is not the communication of such 
given functions that is required but the moves themselves, which 
becomes possible by re-dubbing them. But how can this be done? 
The most simple answer is that we as Player II have to make a 
quick survey of assignments of the properties enlisted as the 
possible strategies of Player I along the line of a given 
function and select the greatest of them, and define the 
horizontal property as a new specification required by Player I 
in the game. This amounts to saying that he could have used 
this new specification as a definition of his move, but then 
he would have intended the identity function, which in turn 
reduces the possibility of playing. This throws open our matrix 
to infinite possiblities. 
In laying down our rules for syntactic formulations we have 
to answer some very important questions; first, how can rules 
of introducing these specification functions be incorporated 
into a general syntactic framework? Second, at what stage will 
our rules introduce these functions into propositions or other 
types of utterance in order to leave variables unbound, and 
when should games for quantifiers start? Third, how can we 
account for the fact that our matrixes do not differentiate 
between general terms and predicates? How can functions for 
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verbs be introduced? And forth, how can the difference between 
propositions and such specification functions be explained 
away? 
Syntactically riddles are like.propositions or can be transformed 
into constructions similar to propositions; however what refutes 
such a claim is that in applying some rules from game-theoretical 
semantics to arrive at atomic sentences, one will find them 
unverifiable or irremediably false. As the latter cannot be 
accepted empirically (if they are false how could they serve 
as means of transmitting important information?), we have to 
account for their different character. Take e.g. the following 
construction after Hintikka as explicating a riddle: 
(6) X - every 7 who Z ~ W 
If we apply Game (every) to (6) we undoubtedly get a false 
proposition: 
(7) b is a Y and b Z 
just because Y and Z may very well contain incompatible 
properties as in (5) "blind cock" or in (4) "red mastiff", 
etc. This comes down to the fact that (6) requires some specifica-
• ion functions. However, as we have seen, many riddles contain 
. property for the range of reference so that the solution 
could be computed. If so, consider Z such a range and take T as 
a computable property for Yj then our verifying rule has to give 
us something like 
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(8) b is a T and b Z 
(8) can now be put to a verification test of individual seeking 
and may still prove either true or false; if it is the former, 
then we have solved the riddle correctly; if it is the latter, 
then we have committed some mistake and a corresponding game 
should start again. This approach naturally would raise the 
problem of false constructions; for, it follows from what we 
have already said, that a false truth-value can at any time 
make us re-consider our original sentence and may suggest the 
need of applying a new specification function to it, i.e. it 
may necessitate a new game. If so, then a false proposition 
cannot be false in reality but rather it calls for the game to 
be played anew. The straight-forwardness of this claim appears 
to be grounded if we differentiate once again between the two 
kinds of game: to play a verificational game is based on the 
seeking and finding processes of individuals, i.e. it is a game 
played in and with Nature, and it seems right that games for 
quantifiers should be given in this way; if a sentence results 
in being verified by such a process, then we are get confirmed 
by having uttered it; whereas if it proves to be false, then 
there can very easily be some problem with any of the expressions 
occurring in it, and we may feel an urgent need to eliminate 
and substitute it. But this latter process is no longer a 
process in and with Nature; it is a process within the 
boundaries of language and theory: they simply have to be 
re-written, and our n'ew game rules should provide us with 
instructions about the way they can be reformulated. Call this 
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game a sort of transcriptional game; its role will be to re-
write a sentence so that it could prove to be true 'with the 
greatest probability, i.e. it maximalizes our winning proba-
bility in the second, verificational game. And this is the 
most we can make out of their relationship: each successful 
verificational game presupposes a successful transcriptional 
game, whereas a lost verificational game will prove a sentence 
false only if it does so with each outcome of a different 
transcriptional game that can be played over the given sentence. 
This latter claim may not seem normal, but this is what makes 
riddles possible to be posed: a necessarily false truthvalue 
calling for a transcriptional game; and this is what our (SSP) 
has already indicated. Riddles then can be considered as a 
special call for such games; although they are not proposit-ons, 
they can be correlated with an act, be it an act of referring 
or not, i.e. the possibility of a verificational game cannot 
be excluded, but their semantic structure is based on the rules 
one can associate with transcriptional games in order to provide 
new surface forms. Their semantic structure should contain in 
some sense those specification functions that are required for 
arriving at the new surface forms. We distinguish two such 
functions, namely one that takes any of the expressions of the 
original sentence as an argument or a correct substitution 
instance and specifies a new one as a corresponding value, and 
we call it a Reference Function, and another that we have called 
an Equal Distribution Function; we can correlate two different 
transcriptional rules with our matrix: 
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G(RF) I f a s e n t e n c e h a s the.form X - every Y who Z - W, 
play should not proceed unless a new function F has 
specified one or other of its constitutents; if Y is 
such a constituent, the Hearer may choose F with T 
as a corresponding value, and the game can start 
with respect to X - every Y who F T who Z - W. 
G(RF) c-Lear-'-y does not depend on every, i.e. on what quantifiers 
a given sentence may contain. So Gfjy?) can really be generalized 
to any kind of sentence. . 
G (EDF) a s e n t e n c e h a s t h e f° r m X - every Y who Z - (/, 
play should not proceed unless a new function G has 
equally specified one or other of its constituents 
and any new constituent too; if W is is auch a 
constituent to be equally specified as V, the 
Hearer may choose G and V respectively and the game 
can have a start with respect to 
X - every Y who Z and G V - G W. 
The same goes for G ( E D F j a s f°r G( r f)- t w o r u l e s naturally 
can be applied together, the Hearer then is making a joint move. 
If we apply them to (4) we can say something like: applying 
C(RF): 
(9) Every mastiff who has in his mouth a tongue which is 
red is in a red courtyard. 
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applying G ( e d f ) 
(10) Every mastiff who has in his mouth a tongue which is 
red and is in the closed space of a cavity which is 
red is in the closed space of a courtyard. 
In getting the surface form (10) we should further segment W 
into U who Z and apply G to V or to U who Z depending on what 
constituents we consider can be eliminated. This need not be 
any restriction on our rules but amounts to predicting that 
by the help of a function a syntactically dependent constituent 
may or may not be eliminated together with its head-phrase. 
But to bring the idea home we should pair our game-rules for 
the introduction of certain functions with game-rules for real 
elimination. As we never answer with (10) to a riddle, we have 
to get rid of all those constituents for which the new functions 
have been introduced. To generalize it we can formulate all our 
conditions in one rule as the Hearer may have applied G(ppj and/or 
C(EDF) m a n y t i m e s ' 
If a game has resulted in a sentence of the form (Elv) 3 
X - every Y who F T who Z and G V - G W 
all constituents for which new functions have been 
introduced, all functions F and all functions G 
with eliminable constituents can be left out, and 
the Hearer may define his (joint) move with respect 
to 
T who Z and G V. 
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Applying to (10) we get the acceptable form of (11): 
(11) A tongue which is red and is in the closed space of 
a cavity which is red. 
In some cases a modified version o f - G ^ ^ j is applied when all 
functions G can be eliminated except the new constituents each 
G^ has introduced. To make a move in a transcriptional game 
amounts to applying G and/or together the corres-
pondent G^.J. j. Having played off this game the players can 
start a new verificational game as soon as they agree on a 
surface form like (11). To start a verificational game appears 
to be dependent on the players' recognition that no transcrip-
tional semantic game could be played. This adds to the inter-
dependence of the two games; for, it is not only thai a verifica-
tional^ game actually verifies a surface structure sentence but 
the possibility of such verification must be presupposed before 
any new game can start. This we called the maximalization of 
winning probabilities in the new verificational game. This 
amounts to defining a given sentence as containing expressions 
whose categories are licensed by what G. Nunberg calls 'normal 
beliefs'. This would mean that the final output of a transcrip-
tional game has always to be governed by normal beliefs. This 
condition can also be imposed as a pre-condition of games for 
a certain sub-domain of linguistic data. The use of transcrip-
tional games always shows the level of conventionalized beliefs 
correlated with a specific utterance. From this it follows that 
maximalization relies on what has been accepted as normal in a 
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given context. This accords very nicely with our (PCI) and 
(PC2). The.end of transcriptional games is tested by such 
beliefs of the players. And as long as no such surface structure 
is arrived at, a sentence cannot be deemed true or false. But if 
riddles are considered to be special calls for such transcip-
tional games, they cannot again be either true or false. They 
are just 'waiting' to be verified. But if so, riddles cannot be 
taken to be normal questions, either. For, questions are 
correctly viewed as what can be truely answered by responding 
with a given proposition. How else can we account for the fact 
that almost any riddle can be made to be part of a syntactic 
question? If question-words do give an interrogative character 
to riddles, then to keep up with an erotetic logic we could 
say that our rules map the input forms against the output so 
that they preserve meaning; but it should be clear already 
that no two surface forms can be considered perfectly the same 
for different strategy applications would have resulted in 
different output sentences; this means that each output sen-
tence has a quasi-uncountable output structure set into which 
it can be mapped provided there are certain functions contextually 
available for the players. Then the relationship specified by 
riddles is quite different from the question-answer relationship. 
Another piece of evidence for this is that questions are usually 
i 
thought to be functions over individuals, whereas riddles 
contain functions over expressions that we called stereotypes, 
and so question-words here can only be taken to be functions 
over functions. So while there is syntactic evidence for riddles 
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being considered as questions, there is a strong semantic 
argument against'this. For we can by all means transform (4) 
into a syntactically interrogative structure and say 
(12) What dog is red and is in a red courtyard? 
But we can by no means reply to (12) with something like (13) 
trying to meet the demands of erotetic logic: 
(13) The tongue is a red dog and is in a red courtyard. 
That (13) is highly flawed can be seen from there being 
eliminable expressions in it, which would mean in turn that, 
if put to a verificational game, (13) is going to be found 
hopelessly false. And this should amount to telling us that in 
making a move like (13) in our transcriptional game we became 
irremediably lost. To clarify what we have said about the 
interrogative character of riddles, we can try to re-formulate 
(12) in order to show correc.tly what the role of a question-
-word can be; 
(14) What function(s) can be applied to a red dog in a 
red courtyard? 
or (14') What function is such that a red dog is in a red 
courtyard? 
Question-words in riddles cannot be applied directly to the 
referents of the expressions therein, but to the expressions 
themselves. Each interrogative form like (12) if found in the 
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data should be transformed into something like (14) or (14'). 
It would prompt a meta-llnguistic reading; however it is imme-
diately seen that it is meta-linguistic only in the sense that 
an answer informs as about what moves have or will have been 
made in the course of a given game; i.e. question-words specify 
our G a n d G rules, but do not tell us anything about 
the actual input structures and their possible verification. 
But without the latter, as we have seen, riddles cannot have 
a full sway in the life of a given community. Question-words 
in riddles belie then an ambiguous character: they do not belong 
to the same linguistic level as the remaining elements do, but 
they express the need for playing a transcriptional game before 
playing any other. 
5. Actions and Riddles: A Problem of Narrativity 
That verificational games are functions of transcriptional ones 
is borne out by the general relationship of language and action 
as such; we have seen that a language game consists of two 
separate games: a 'pure' semantical game in which the correct 
reference expressions are sorted out and a 'referential* in 
which the right individuals are singled out. Their interdepend-
ence was straightforward: every referential game presupposes a 
correct surface"atructure with which its moves can be correlated, 
but any surface structure results from a previous game played 
over the expressions themselves. In case no such game seems to 
be apparent, the function of identity is presupposed, and it 
then means that the beliefs licensing it are readily available. 
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On the other hand a transcriptional game is always dependent 
on previously played-off referential games when strategical 
functions are being selected from among (SSP); for these 
functions should always select a natural range of individuals 
so that it overlaps with what has been defined as the range 
of reference for the utterance. Their interdependence clearly 
illuminates the entanglement of language with notions; but it 
also illuminates the lack of any causal relationship; for their 
functional interdependence relies on which algorithm has been 
selected in the first transcriptional game; but it is always 
contingent on the strategical move of Player II, even if he 
does his best to make up with his opponent's intention. Whereas 
even Player I, the Hearer himself may intend the most far-
fetched functions when uttering a sentence. And in some cases, 
such as in fiction, it can result that the intersection of the 
range of reference and of any natural range is empty; this 
amounts to acquiring new information; then we can either set 
out on our search, which may turn to be infinite, or else . 
interrupt the second game as deadlocked. But there are no such 
ways out if the correlated action is not an act of reference 
but something different; we have already hinted at the possi-
bility of a special riddle session when each answer should be 
accompanied by a deictic gesture with respect to the object 
meant. But the riddle-solver may be requested to' carry out some 
action as well; he may be expected to do something with the 
correct referents; then the actions themselves have to be 
deciphered by the. use of some transcriptional game-rule. And a 
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correct deciphering is indicated by carrying out the action 
in question and not just by uttering it: e.g. in a legendary 
folktale King Matthias asks a young maiden - among many other 
things - both to bring and not to bring him a present; this is 
all the more interesting because it is the last game in a riddle 
session in'which she always has to reply in a cunning way but 
never to do anything. And in the last she answers by bringing 
a dove as a present which flies away at the moment of its 
deliverance. To draw up an algorithm for it may appear a bit 
complicated, but it should precede the accomplishment of any 
kind of action; first, a choice has to be made on the correct 
range of reference: select 'present' as such for 'bringing-and-
-not-bringing' is contradictory, so unrealizable; now, a 
function must be counted for the latter: it can either give 
another action like 'sending', or be further segmented into a 
correct range and an aliminable part: then it can be either 
'bringing' or 'not-bringing'; in either cases the contradictory 
character is dispensed with by finding another predicate like 
'flying away' for 'not-bringing'; as 'not-bringing' is to be 
specified as a three-placed predicate 'x not-bringing y to z ' 
and 'flying away' is only two-placed 'y flying away from w', 
during the transcriptional game different pairings of the 
corresponding variables are possible; from them y=v and ¡0=2 
are selected on the basis of a function like "t does not 
have/possess/get/etc. u" which is ah EDF for y and v, and w 
and z respectively; then we should select a sub-domain of the 
intersection of the natural range of 'flying away' with the 
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range of reference of 'present' so that we negate something 
that is a present but cannot fly away. This with 'bringing' 
as also a range specifies birds as such presents. In computing 
the final 'x bringing to z y flying away from 2' composite 
function we have alternative choices; they would specify 
other results like the previously mentioned 'x sending y to a', 
or '̂c not-bringing to 3 y flying to 3'; computing them would 
necessitate the accomplishment of other actions. 
In the above case we substituted another action into the second, 
verificational game usually taken up by an act of reference. 
The range of actions is naturally as wide as the range of 
objects that can be referred to; what makes possible the 
introduction of actions into riddles is that to understand 
what one should do requires the use of certain functions as 
well as to understand what some stereotypes or predicates mean. 
This accounts for the universal character of riddles. To put 
it more exactly, if transcriptional games are played over some 
range into which the Hearer of the utterance containing it can 
be substituted, then to play off a game might involve the 
Hearer as a sample of the correct individuals. This is a 
syntactic device to show it can be the imperative; then the 
whole sequence of transcriptional and verificational games have 
to be played off; but this need not bear on the general 
character of riddles; a riddle game can stop at any point. 
Of course, we can introduce new terms for riddles when the 
second, verificational game is played off differently. But if 
sequences can be interrupted, how can we define winning 
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strategies? Naturally a winning strategy in a sequence must 
be a composite of each; but whether there is a winning strategy 
in the first, transcriptional game strongly depends-on whether 
it is also winning in the second, verificational game, which 
in turn can never be considered as winning unless it is a 
function of some transcriptional game from which a correct 
surface structure has resulted. This leads to a vicious circle; 
a winning strategy in a transcriptional game depends on whether 
three is a winning strategy in a correlated verificational game, 
while one in the latter depends on there being a transcriptional 
winning strategy of which it can be the function. However this 
is as it should be; for to escape from such a vicious circle 
language can do nothing else but resort to conventionalized 
uses, i.e. it accepts certain surface structures as a priori 
correct, although this 'a priori' has nothing to do with ana-
liticity. It means that convention licenses certain correlations 
as accepted to be correct; but there are ho once-and-for-all 
winning strategies in transcriptional games that uniquely 
define winning strategies in the second, and there are no 
once-for-all winning strategies in verificational games that 
uniquely define winning strategies in the first; neither 
analiticity nor inductivity works perfectly. Speaking is not 
only an act of referring but an act of selecting linguistic 
expressions by which an act of referring can be most easily 
and most probably carried out. But nothing prescribes that 
any particular correlation should be fixed for ever. And if 
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it can vary once, then it has to be allowed that it might vary 
at other times. This way we naturally lose the possibility of 
determining meaning uniquely if meaning has anything to do with 
reference. But this is what game-theoretical semantics seems 
to prompt us to do all the more. If we dispense with all fixed 
correlations, then any surface structure may convey the 
possibility of correlation. This was what helped in creating 
fictional discourses, although there may be some ultimate 
barrier to our (SSP) that something like "Finnegans1 Wake" 
indicates. 
Our game-sematnical approach shows then some very important 
ways of disambiguations: terms, predicates, imperatives and 
stereotypes are all treated on a par; so far so good; but how 
can we explain away the ambiguity in a riddle about samples 
of objects and actions which are particular in the sense that 
persons like the Hearer can carry them out? How can we explain 
away the difference between the universal character of riddles 
and the existential character of an action? As far as transcrip-
tional games are concerned we have observed many times that 
there is no uniqueness of individuals being required but rather 
a sample of them (Cf. the abbreviated form of value-assignments 
of our matrixes). And this goes for our game-rules, too: there 
is no specially quantified character involved; variables are 
still open. This accords with the fact that games for quantifiers 
are verificational games; a player chooses an individual which 
is no longer a sample but concrete in the sense that even he 
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should be named If he has not been already. If we speak about 
riddles with a universal character, it is Player II who, 
playing the part of Nature, should select an individual in the 
second, verificational game of the sequence, and prove the 
resulted surface structure against his choice; whereas if we 
speek about existentially quantified sentences, particular 
actions or narrative texts, it should be Player I to choose an 
individual but it is still Player II to prove the resulted 
surface structure against his opponent's choice. But this 
considerably adds to the difficulty of Player II to prove a 
certain surface structure; for any instance would not do; so 
much so that in most cases Player II gives up, and Player I 
should verify his own riddle. Communication breaks down: the 
winning strategy of Player II is always the condition of 
successful communication. 
6. Some Conclusive Remarks; A Parable of Fiction 
To end our investigations we should revive some of the previous 
assumptions and state them in a more concise form. First, 
riddles are played, and can be either a sequence of sequences 
of two tjames, a transcriptional and a verificational game, or 
a sequence of transcriptional games. Of course, a given se-
quence need not«be the same all through the play for it may 
incorporate different actions or different transcriptional games 
as well: Player II has always to decide what game the moves of 
his opponent define before he can correctly react. We presented 
two kinds of transcriptional games, a meta-linguistic and one 
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for property-selection; there are certainly others, but they 
are analyzable along the lines described here. Second, riddles 
reveal a very important character of language in that the 
reference classes of the expressions can further be removed 
from the utterances the expressions appearing or-not; so much 
so that the Hearer first should compute possible reference 
functions to get to the correct referents. If so, then third, 
cur transcriptional rules are part and parcel of what an 
utterance may mean, and as such it should contain the Hearer 
without which it will be simply meaningless or ununderstandable. 
In this and only in this sense can riddles enter a text whether 
narrative or not. For narrativity depends just on which player 
chooses an individual in the verificational game with respect 
to which a given sequence should be played off over a surface 
structure that resulted from the first, transcriptional game. 
This means that there is no constraint on forthcoming role 
selection, i.e. the games for quantifiers or for other 
verifying processes must be independent in type from what 
functions have been chosen to compute a correct surface 
structure before. It can be either verified universally by 
Player II or existentially by Player I choosing an individual. 
This seems right; for our transcriptional rules cannot have 
any direct bearing on Hintikka's rules for quantifiers. 
Variables are still unbound for no moves have been made to 
bind them; The use of 'any' comes in handy here to show the 
openness of transcriptional games; for, in "I like anything 
there is to eat" there can be nothing against a possible 
verification of it by the Hearer's saying "There is only 
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spinach". If you say "I will have any horse you give" I can 
make you agree with saying "I've got only Blackie left". In 
both cases a single instance verifies a sentence containing 
'any' with the only difference to an existential quantifier 
that it is always the Hearer!that can come up with it; for it 
would sound strange if the Speaker put in something like "Okay, 
please, bring beefsteak with roast potatoes" and "Right, I 
will have any horse you own, so please give me Brownie". 
Although in the above examples there was one arid only one 
instance that could verify what the Speaker said. If 'any' 
were ab ovo universal, the Hearer could not verify the 
Speaker's utterance containing 'any' in case of there being a 
single existing individual that can count as an instance. 
Naturally it is possible to answer that there is nothing to 
ea;t, or that there are no more horses left. Then nobody could 
choose an individual with respect to which a given surface 
structure can be verified or not. Then a sequence of games 
gets deadlocked. This can equally happen when, we speak about 
dragons that do not exist or of horses that are winged. The 
corresponding moves in the game scan zero-assignments; but one 
can never know that it is zero because no strategy can lead 
to a correct substitution instance, that the predicates are 
true of no possible object, or because there are no objects 
such that the given predicates could be true of; in the first 
case a sequence of games are thought to have been played off 
and proved to have been played with losing strategies; in the 
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second no such play has been conducted yet, or if it has it 
has been deadlocked. But how can we prove that a strategy is 
losing by finding none? What difference can there be between 
a game that is deadlocked and another that cannot have come 
up with a true instance? Fictional discourse indicates this 
kind of ambiguity: there can at any time start a new seeking 
process which becomes deadlocked without being able to prove 
that strategies in the transcriptional games are losing. There 
is a last corollary of this argument; namely that if a value-
-assignment belonging to a move in a transcriptional game is 
zero, then Player II has got nothing to choose as his 
forthcoming move in the second, verificational game, which 
turns out to mean that with fictional surface forms, i.e. with 
structures of deadlocked games, no universal conclusions are 
possible. If a move-assignment is already positive, then a 
new instance can add to its universal character. So, about 
fictional beings - if there are any! - we cannot coherently 
assert universal propositions like "All dragons are seven-
-headed" just because we have no single true instance with 
respect to them. So, in fiction we are forever doomed to be 
narrative; for, we can always claim that a new verificational 
game might start although later becoming deadlocked, while we 
can never say that there are fictional objects because then 
we should have other than zero-assignments belonging to the 
moves we make in asserting something about them. Naturally in 
many cases values are assigned by different belief contexts, 
- 164 -
in epistemic logics or in fiction within fiction. The problem 
of beliefs looms large, for false or misfired beliefs can 
threaten our conception of winning strategy since within a 
certain text there is no explicit criterion about what can 
count as a possible endpoint of search. A normally deadlocked 
strategy can then turn out to be winning as well. Universal 
statements can also appear to be verifiable, although we do 
not think that the can destroy all our whole argument; for any 
kind of play consisting of a transcriptional and a verifica-
tional game needs the incorporation of something which counts 
as ultimately verifying a sentence; why cannot we have e.g. a 
text in front of us as players in order to look for each 
correct surface structure in it? If we can find one, it is true, 
if not, then it is false. But we can even play with a sage of 
the tribe and ask him after each move whether there is anything 
on the plate of his memory to verify a given form. And we could 
go on. But whatever conventions we do have about truth, the lo-
gic of our games would not change: we are still computing 
algorithms with the help of which we want to keep up with the 
Speaker: understand him and follow him. Truth is always a 
sort of correlation, here a correlation of two games making up 
a sequence; but in many cases we as Speakers and much loss as 
Hearers know on.nothing about actual end-points of verifica-
tional games; we presuppose that some - if any - correlation 
obtains, and revert to (SSP). 
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Notes 
1 Cf. Abrahams (1969) . 
2 Cf. Eigen-Winkler (1975) . 
3 
The main lines of such an approach can be found in "Language-
-Games for Quantifiers" in Hintikka (1973), and in Hintikka 
(1979) . 
4 Cf. Flahault (1981) . 
5 Cf. Permyakov-Barabanova (1982). 
6 Cf. Faik-Nzuji (1973) . 
7 Cf. E. Köngas-Maranda (1972) . 
o 
L. Tarnay "Megjegyzések a találós egyszerű fórmájához", 
manuscript. 
9 Cf. Nunberg (1978) . 
1 0 Cf. Hintikka (1976) , especially Chapter 11. 
** See fn. 5. 
12 
These are taken from Barabanova's text, but naturally they 
cannot be word-for-word translations of the original. l 3 For the idea of interrupted games see Tennant (1979). 
14 x See fn. 9. 
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